Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law
Journal
Volume 4 Volume IV
Number 1 Volume IV Book 1

Article 8

1993

EEC Licensing of Intellectual Property
Valentine Korah
Fordham University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj
Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law
Commons

Recommended Citation
Valentine Korah, EEC Licensing of Intellectual Property, 4 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 55
(1993).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol4/iss1/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal
by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information,
please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

Session II: EEC Licensing of Intellectual
Property

EEC Licensing of Intellectual Propertyt
Valentine Korah'
I.

INTRODUCTION TO ARTICLE

A.
B.
C.
D.

85 OF THE EEC TREATY

Article 85
Sunk costs and ancillary restrictions
Importance and difficulty of analyzing ex ante
Invalidity of agreements

E. Possible ways of dealing with the Commission's case
load
1. Formal decisions on individual notifications
2. Informal comfort letters
3. Conditions and obligations may be attached
to an exemption or comfort letter
4. Bifurcation of Article 85(1) and (3)
5. Group exemptions for patent and know-how
licenses: Regulations 2349/84 and 556/89

57
57
58
59
61
62
62
62
63
64
65

t This paper was written and presented by Valentine Korah at the Fordham Conference on International Intellectual Property Law and Policy held at Fordham University
School of Law on April 15-16, 1993. Professor Korah's paper includes excerpts from
VALENTINE KORAH, KNow-How LICENSING AGREEMENTS AND THE EEC COMPETITION
RULES: REGULATION 556/89 (1989) and VALENTINE KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE
TO EEC COMPETITION LAW AND PRACICE (4th ed. 1990), and are reprinted with permission of the copyright owner. Both books were written with the help of Warwick A.
Rothnie.
* Emeritus Professor of Competition Law, University College-London; Visiting
Professor, Fordharn University School of Law, New York; College of Europe, Bruges;
Universidad Carlos III, Madrid; and University of Lusiada, Lisbon and Oporto; Barrister
and Author.

56

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 4:55

6. Narrower construction of Article 85(1)
F. Conclusion

65
66

II. INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF THE FREE MOVEMENT
66
OF GOODS AND SERVICES
A. Intellectual property rights are national

66

B. Attempted avoidance of competition rules

67

C. Free movement of goods within the Common
Market

67

D. Birth of the distinction between the existence and
exercise of a right

68

E. Exhaustion of intellectual property rights when the
product has been sold by or with the consent of the
holder

69

1. The Court retracts somewhat

71

2. Incentives and rewards for innovation

71

III. THE COMMISSION'S COMPETITIVE CONCERNS ABOUT
TECHNOLOGY LICENSES

73

A. Limited exclusive licenses foreclose and divide the
Common Market

73

B. No challenge clauses foreclose when the patent is
not valid

75

C. Strong obligationsto share improvements are unfair
and reduce the incentive to invest in improvements

75

IV. THE GROUP EXEMPTION REGULATIONS FOR PATENT AND

KNOW-HOW LICENSES

76

A. Two clauses taken through the group exemption for
know-how licensing as an example of how it operates 77
1. Extent of territorial protection of the licensor

77

2. Agreement to pay monies in advance

78

B. The Commission'splans for when the PatentRegulation expires next year
V. CONCLUSION

79
79

1993]
I.

EEC LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

INTRODUCTION TO ARTICLE 85 OF THE

EEC TREATY

A. Article 85
Article 85(1) of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community' ("EEC Treaty") prohibits, as incompatible with the
Common Market, agreements that may affect trade between Member States and which have the object or effect of restricting competition within the Common Market. Article 85(3) provides for exemption from this prohibition. Exemption can be granted when
collaboration leads to improvements in production or distribution
of goods or promotes technical or economic progress. Only the

1. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11, 47-48 (1958), amended by Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987]
2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
Article 85 reads:
(1) The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the Common
Market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of
undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member
States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or
distortion of competition within the Common Market, and in particular those
which: (a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other
trading conditions; (b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment; (c) share markets or sources of supply; (d) apply dissimilar
conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing
them at a competitive disadvantage; (e) make the conclusion of contracts subject
to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their
nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject
of such contracts.
(2) Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall
be automatically void.
(3) The provisions of paragraph (1) may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of:
any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;
any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;
- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices;
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair
share of the resulting benefit, and which does not: (a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of
these objectives; (b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating
competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
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Commission of the European Communities 2 ("Commission") can
grant individual exemptions.3 Under Article 85(2), agreements or
provisions thereof that infringe the Article as a whole are void in
respect of the provisions that restrict competition.4
Multiple objectives are encompassed by this Article-not only
efficiency (firms and industries that provide what consumers are
willing to pay for should expand at the expense of others), but
most importantly, that the Common Market should be integrated
and that smaller firms should be able to enter a market. Foreclosure may harm competitors even when it does not harm consumers.
B. Sunk costs and ancillary restrictions
Most technology licenses involve investment by each party.5
Unless each party is assured that it can appropriate part of the benefits engendered by its investment, it is unlikely to invest. Thus,
often the parties have to ensure: (i) that once the licensee has
committed itself to tooling up and developing the market, the licensor will not license other parties for the same territory and that the
licensor will prevent licensees from other territories from competing there; (ii) that when the licensor has granted an exclusive license for a. territory, the licensee will not cease to use the licensor's invention and turn to competing technology, paying no royalties to the first licensor; and (iii) that the licensee will not challenge the validity of the patent, and meanwhile exploit it without
paying royalties. There may be other terms relating to improvements, reciprocal or otherwise, limitations in time or space, quotas,
or customer restrictions.

2. The Commission of the European Communities, established in Brussels, is the
administrative body responsible for enforcing the competition rules and ensuring that the
EEC Treaty is not infringed.
3. Council Regulation No. 17/62, art. 9, 13 J.0. 204 (1962), O.J. ENG. SPEC. ED.

1959-62, 87, 89. The Council of Ministers in Council Regulation No. 19/65, 36 J.0. 533
(1965), O.J. ENG. SPEC. ED. 1965-66, 35, has also empowered the Commission to grant
exemptions to specified categories of agreements, such as those for patent and know-how
licenses. See infra note 18.
4. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, 298 U.N.T.S at 47-8.
5. Economists call such an investment a "sunk cost" when it cannot be turned to any
other use. To prevent the other party or others appropriating the benefit of such costs,
the investor must ensure his position by an enforceable contract.
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These ancillary restrictions, which may be necessary to induce
investment in developing the original invention and its exploitation,
restrict conduct. The Commission usually treats them as restricting
competition contrary to the prohibition of Article 85(1). Unless the
restrictions are exempted under Article 85(3), it may be difficult to
enforce them because of their invalidity under Article 85(2). A
national court may have to adjourn to enable the Commission to
grant an exemption.
Prompt contractual remedies for infringing ancillary restrictions
on conduct are vital to induce the original investment. The licensor
must invest in developing the technology. The licensee has to set
up production, create a market, and also may have to improve the
technology for industrial use. The Commission lacks the resources
to grant more than a very few individual exemptions each year 6 and
is the only entity with authority to exempt. Therefore it is important that agreements not be treated as infringing Article 85 unless
the risk of reducing competition in the market is realistic.
C. Importance and difficulty of analyzing ex ante
Perceived ex post, as has been the practice of many European
lawyers and officials, these ancillary restrictions are clearly anticompetitive. After the investments have been made, it appears
better if the licensor and all his licensees are free to sell throughout
the Common Market and compete with each other.
Economists, however, are concerned that the right incentives to
investment exist and believe that the situation should be appraised
ex ante, at the time parties decide whether to commit themselves
to investment. The ancillary restrictions needed to provide incentives are procompetitive if, without them, the parties would not
have made the investment. One should compare the position that
has resulted from the collaboration with that which would have
occurred without it.7

6. In the three years from 1990-1992, the Commission granted only thirteen individu-

al exemptions.
7. See Opinion of Advocate-General Roemer, ttablissements Consten SARL &
Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Commission, Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, [1966] E.C.R. 299,
358-9, [1966] C.M.L.R. 418, 431.
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It is difficult to determine whether ancillary restrictions are proor anticompetitive. It may be hard to demonstrate that the parties
would not have made their investment without ancillary restrictions
on conduct; it is easy to argue that they might have made the same
investments with less protection.
It is hardly surprising that officials, most of whom were jurists
of some kind before joining the Commission and few of whom
were familiar with micro-economics or had experience in industry
or commerce, have tended to appraise agreements ex post-at least
when applying the prohibition of Article 85(1). They have been
more flexible when granting exemptions under Article 85(3). Exclusive patent and know-how licenses have been exempted in several decisions. Only once, in Burroughs,8 has the Commission held
that an exclusive license did not restrict competition. In Burroughs
the licensor and both licensees, whose aggregate market share was
under ten percent, were permitted to sell throughout the Common
Market a product for which the cost of transport was negligible.
Other exclusive licenses have been held to fall within the prohibition of Article 85(1) and exempted under Article 85(3), provided
that each licensee was allowed to sell throughout the Common
Market. 9

Properly understood, therefore, Article 85(1) requires a comparison between two
market situations: that which arises after the making of an agreement and that
which would have arisen had there been no agreement. This concrete examination may show that it is not possible for a manufacturer to find an outlet in a
particular part of the market unless he concentrates supply in the hands of a
sole concessionaire. That would signify that in a given situation an exclusive
distributorship agreement has effects which are likely only to promote competition. Such a situation can in particular appear when what is at issue is
gaining access to an [sic] penetrating a market.
Id. (emphasis in original).
The European Court of Justice accepted this example in relation to exclusive distribution in Socidt6 Technique Mini~re v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH, Case 56/65, [1966]
E.C.R. 235, [1966] C.M.L.R. 357, where the territorial protection was less complete.
Compare the justification by Judge Taft of ancillary restrictions in United States v.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
8. Re Agreement of Burroughs AG and ltablissements Delplanque et Fils, J.O. L
13/50 (1972), [1972] C.M.L.R. D67; Re Contract of Burroughs AG and Geha-Werke
GmbH, J.O. L 13/53 (1972), [1972] C.M.L.R. D72.
9. See Zuid Nederlandsche Bronbemaling en Grondboringen BV v. Heidemaat-
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D. Invalidity of agreements
The provisions in agreements that infringe Article 85 by restricting competition within the Common Market are void by virtue
of Article 85(2).'o Only the Commission can grant an exemption."
National court judges in Member States are required to apply European Community ("Community" or "EC") law. Therefore, if an action is brought on a contractual provision, the judge must first
decide whether such provision infringes Article 85(1). If it does
not, he or she can disregard the competition rules. The judge is
likely to be influenced, however, by the wide interpretation given
to the concept of restriction of competition by the Commission.
If the agreement does infringe Article 85(1), the judge must
consider whether it is capable of exemption. If not, parts of the
agreement will be void. If, however, the agreement has been notified to the Commission1 2 with a request for exemption, effective
prior to the period at issue in the litigation, and is of the kind that
the Commission may exempt, the judge is required to adjourn
pending the exemption determination. If the national procedural
rules so permit, the judge also may ask the Commission to provide
13
it with legal and economic data. This is more controversial.

schappij Beheer NV, Case 74/570, O.J. L 249/27 (1975), [1975] 2 C.M.L.R. D67. The

Commission condemned four licenses where the licensor promised to grant no more than
those in the territory, but there was a horizontal element.
10. The Court has repeatedly said that whether the rest of the agreement can stand
is a matter for the national courts. See Socit6 Technique Minire v. Maschinenbau Ulm
GmbH, Case 56/65, [1966] E.C.R. 235, [1966] C.M.L.R. 357; Stergios Delimitis v.
Henninger Brau, Case 234/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-935, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 210.
11. Council Regulation No. 17/62, supra note 3, art. 9(1), 0.1. ENG. SPEC. ED. 195962, at 89.
12. Id. arts. 4-5, 0.1. ENG. SPEC. ED. 1959-62. Notification is the process by which
parties to a contract request Commission review of an agreement's terms for compliance
with Community law.
13. See Stergios Delimitis, [1991] E.C.R. 1-935, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 210; Paul Lasok,
Assessing the Economic Consequences of Restrictive Agreements: A Comment on the
Delimitis Case, 5 EUR. COMMUNrrY L. REV. [E.C.L.R.] 194 (1991); Valentine Korah, The
Judgment in Delimitis, 5 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. [E.I.P.R.] 167 (1992). A longer

version of the latter adapted to an American audience' is to be published later this year
or next in Tulane Civil Law Forum.
In its Notice on cooperation between national courts and the Commission in applying
Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty, O.J. C 39/6 (1992), the Commission said how it
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E. Possible ways of dealing with the Commission's case load
1. Formal decisions on individual notifications
Parties may notify agreements to the Commission requesting
exemption from Article 85(1). Exemption may be granted retroactively to the date of notification. Such an exemption amounts to
a formal decision and binds the parties to whom it is addressed.
A national judge may not treat an agreement as void by virtue of
Article 85(2) when it has been exempted formally, but the Commission may withdraw the benefit of the exemption for the future
if the agreement no longer merits exemption. 4 An exemption does
not affect liability for abusive exploitation of a dominant position
that violates Article 86, the EC's not-very-close analogy to section
2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 5 although the reason that gave rise
to the exemption, especially of an individual agreement, may show
that there is no abusive exploitation of any dominant position.
2. Informal comfort letters
The Commission usually responds to a notification with an
informal comfort letter saying that the agreement merits exemption
and that the file is being closed. Such a letter is not an exemption
and, although a national judge may take it into account when ap-

would implement the Court's suggestions:
40. Lastly, national courts can obtain information from the Commission regarding factualdata, statistics, market studies and economic analyses. The Commis-

sion will endeavor to communicate these data, within the limits laid down in the
following paragraph, or will indicate the source from which they can be obtained.
41. It is in the interest of the proper administration of justice that the Commission should answer requests for legal and factual information in the shortest
possible time. Nevertheless, the Commission cannot accede to such requests
unless several conditions are met. First, the requisite data must actually be at
its disposal. Secondly, the Commission may communicate this data only in so
far as permitted by the general principle of sound administrative practice.
The Commission goes on to mention' its duty not to disclose confidential information
and the neutrality it should observe, which precludes it from assisting unless the request
comes directly or indirectly from the national court.
14. This has never been done by a formal decision, but the threat of withdrawal may
bring pressure on the parties to modify their agreement.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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plying Article 85(1),16 the judge has no power to grant an exemption. A letter stating that the agreement merits exemption, and
therefore implying that it is caught by the prohibition of Article
85(1), places the national judge in a quandary. Even if he or she
adjourns, the Commission may refuse to reopen the file. With my
back to the wall, I would argue a national judge enforcing the
agreement after a Commission letter has been sent stating that the
agreement merits exemption does not amount to the judge granting
an exemption. This is, however dubious.
3. Conditions and obligations may be attached to an exemption.or comfort letter
The main reason why specialized practitioners do not recommend that many agreements be notified to the Commission for an
exemption, is that the Commission may intervene and require
changes to be made to the agreement after the parties' relative
bargaining positions have changed.
In ARD, 17 MGM and United Artists granted an almost exclusive
copyright license for West Germany to certain German broadcasting organizations ("ARD") for $80 million. ARD was to scrutinize
a large library of films, some four to five percent of the total stock
of films available worldwide, and to dub those that it thought suitable for transmission in Germany. The term of the license was
long-about twenty-five years for some of the films. The agreement was notified to the Commission. The Commission decided
that the exclusive license foreclosed third parties and that the size
of the library was far greater and the term of the license far longer
than was usual in the trade. It, therefore, refused to grant an exemption until ARD waived part of its contractual exclusive rights.
In order to receive the exemption, ARD had to permit the licen16. See, e.g., Procureur de la Rdpublique v. Giry and Gutrlain SA, Joined Cases
253/78 & 1-3/79, [1980] E.C.R. 2327, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 99.
17. Commission Decision of 15 September 1989 Relating to a. Proceeding Under
Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/31.734-Film Purchases by German Television Stations), 89/536/EEC, O.J. L 284/36 (1989), [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 841, appeal pending sub.
nom; Algemene Financieringsmaatschappij Nefico B.V. v. Commission, Case T-157/89,
[1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 161; see Warwick A. Rothnie, Comment, Commission Re-runs the
Same Old Bill (Film Purchases by German Television Stations), 2 E.I.P.R. 72 (1990).
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sors to license others to transmit the films that it did not exploit.
ARD also agreed that the "windows" during which third parties
could license films be greatly expanded, that it would provide such
third parties with dubbed copies of the films where available, and
would pay half the cost of dubbing any others.
German viewers benefitted by having more films available on
television and by seeing the more popular ones more often. The
copyright holders obtained further lucrative opportunities to grant
licenses. Perceived ex post, the market is more competitive. Seen
ex ante, the result may be different. Will another film studio be
able to find a firm like ARD who is prepared to invest substantial
sums for the license and much effort to exploit English language
films in countries where another language is spoken? More serious
still, the Commission's dislike of innovation increases the risk of
collaboration to exploit a market for the benefit of consumers.
4. Bifurcation of Article 85(1) and (3)
The Commission often treats vertical restraints strictly under the
prohibition of Article 85(1). Vertical restraints are perceived as
isolating the market in each Member State. Some vertical agreements, including exclusive technology licenses, are exempted en
bloc, provided that the agreement fits within the rigid limitations
of the applicable regulation. 8
The practice of exempting ancillary restraints, rather than finding them outside the prohibition of Article 85(1), had the advantage
that the difficult decisions were centralized in the Commission,
which had very wide discretion whether to grant exemptions. Had
the difficult decisions as to whether the ancillary restraints were
anticompetitive been left to courts in Member States, their judgments might well have been hard to reconcile.
Interpreting Article 85(1) widely has a grave disadvantage. It

18. See, e.g., Commission Regulation No. 556/89 of 30 November 1988 on the

Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Know-how Licensing Agreements, O.J. L 61/1 (1989) [hereinafter Know-how Regulation]; Commission
Regulation No. 2349/84 of 23 July 1984 on the Application of Article 85(3) of the
Treaty to Certain Categories of Patent Licensing Agreements, O.J. L 219/15 (1984),
corrected by O.J. C 113/34 (1985) [hereinafter Patent Regulation].
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ensures that most ancillary restraints necessary to the exploitation
of intellectual property will be found violative of Article 85(1),
thereby requiring exemption if important terms of a license agreement are to be enforced. The Commission lacks the resources to
grant many exemptions-it has never managed more than ten exemptions under Article 85(3) in a single year. Problems in enforcing the terms of a license must result in marginally fewer licenses
being granted.
5. Group exemptions for patent and know-how licenses:
Regulations 2349/84 and 556/8919
Since the Commission nearly always states that any element of
exclusivity forecloses third parties, most patent licenses and knowhow licenses are brought within the terms of one of the group exemptions. The group exemption for patent licenses ("Patent Regulation") is very narrow and is rarely applicable, but the exemption
for know-how licenses ("Know-how Regulation") is more liberal.
Combined patent and know-how licenses usually are adapted to fall
within the know-how group exemption's terms. The Regulations
are not always clear, therefore adaptation is not entirely risk-free.
I am surprised by the extent to which commercial clients are prepared to enter into important agreements without being sure whether the agreement is enforceable. It is disgraceful that they should
have to do so. Counsel should be able to give firm advice.
6. Narrower construction of Article 85(1)
The European Court of Justice has accepted partly a doctrine
that ancillary restraints necessary to make investment viable do not
infringe Article 85(1). In Nungesser,20 the European Court of Justice said that in order to encourage investment by a licensor and
licensee in the development of an important new variety of maize
seed protected by plant breeders rights, it is necessary to permit
open exclusivity-a license where the licensor agrees neither to exploit in the territory nor to license anyone else to do so. Therefore,

19. Patent Regulation, supra note 18; Know-how Regulation, supra note 18.
20. L.C. Nungesser KG v. Commission, Case 258/78, [1982] E.C.R. 2015, [1983]
1 C.M.L.R. 278.
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such a license does not infringe Article 85(1).21 Nevertheless, without any analysis of the amount of protection needed, the Court
added that absolute territorial protection manifestly goes too far
ever to be exempted. 22
If the Commission were less formalistic in analyzing agreements and followed the case law of the Court, industry would not
have to distort agreements to come within the confines of a group
exemption.
F. Conclusion
National courts may well follow the Commission's decisions.
There are few judgments reported from national courts. A national
court has no power to exempt, so it only can adjourn while the
Commission decides. By then, the defendant is a complainant
providing ammunition to the Commission. The Commission may
refuse to exempt important provisions or require changes to be
made by one or both parties. A defendant may be able to prevent
an exemption being granted by refusing to make amendments desired by the Commission. ARD was able to waive its rights, but
even that possibility is being challenged by the licensors on appeal.
Courts must be able to enforce agreements that increase, rather than
decrease, competition under Article 85(1), but it takes a strong
minded national judge to decide contrary to the Commission's
practice.
Competition presupposes markets, which presuppose exclusive
rights and the normal performance of agreements. In a sinful
world this requires that contracts be enforceable.
II. INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF THE FREE MOVEMENT OF
GOODS AND SERVICES

A. Intellectual property rights are national
Intellectual property rights still are governed by national law.
Some harmonization has taken place, but the Community Patent

21. Id. at 2069, 1 58, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. at 353.
22. Id. at 2070, 1 62, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. at 354.
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Convention 23 has not yet been ratified by sufficient States to come
into force. Moreover, the law of each country grants rights only
for that country. An inventor wanting protection in all Member
States must apply for a patent in each State.
B. Attempted avoidance of competition rules
Since the 1960s, it has been widely accepted that Article 85
forbids the imposition of export bans on licensees. Nevertheless,
it was thought that by relying on the separate national laws governing intellectual property rights, a holder in several Member States
might achieve the same result. A licensor might grant a license,
for instance, under the French patent or limited to France, and rely
on national rights in Germany to restrain imports from France. In
some Member States, the doctrine of exhaustion prevented the use
of such rights to restrain the sale of goods put on the market legally, by or with the consent of the holder. This rule did not apply in
all Member States. In those where it did apply, to some kinds of
intellectual property rights, it sometimes applied only to sales within the country. Hence, sales abroad rarely exhausted national patent rights.
C. Free movement -ofgoods within the Common Market
Markets in different Member States often will bear very different prices. Often,. this is due to government measures. For instance, there are price controls for pharmaceutical products in several Member States, and some Member States grant only process
and not product patents. The basic principle of the Common Market, however, is that goods, services, workers, and capital should
circulate freely without hinderance from tariffs, quotas, or measures
of equivalent effect imposed by Member States. Consequently,
traders buy in the low priced States and sell where prices are higher. Such parallel trade tends to reduce price differences.
The principle of the free movement of goods is implemented by
Articles 30 to 36 of the EEC Treaty. Article 30 provides:
Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having

23. Convention for the European Patent for the Common Market, Dec. 15, 1975,
Luxembourg, 15 IL.M. 5.
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equivalent effect shall... be prohibited between Member
States.u
Article 36 provides a derogation from the principle:
The provisions of Articles 30-34 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports... justified on grounds of
. . the protection of industrial and commercial property.
Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States.25
Article 36 has been narrowly construed because it derogates from
a fundamental principle of the Common Market.
D. Birth of the distinction between the existence and exercise
of a right
Consten & Grundig v. Commission26 was an early case decided
under the competition rules. To encourage its dealer, Consten, to
incur sunk costs, Grundig included several ancillary rights in the
license agreement. Consten was granted an exclusive territory
supported by export bans and permission to register the "Gint"
mark in France.27 The products also bore the mark "Grundig," by
which the public could recognize their origin. 28 Consten sued traders, who imported Grundig apparatus from Germany where it was
approximately twenty-five percent cheaper, for trademark infringement. The Commission condemned the absolute territorial protection conferred.29
In upholding the Commission's decision, the European Court
of Justice distinguished the existence of national property rights,
which, according to Articles 36 and 222 of the EEC Treaty, is a
matter for national law, from their exercise, which is subject to the

24. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 30, 298 U.N.T.S. at 26.
25. Id. art. 36, 298 U.N.T.S. at. 29 (emphasis added).
26. Itablissements Consten SARL & Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Commission,
Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, [1966] E.C.R. 299, [1966] C.M.L.R. 418.
27. Id. at 303, [1966] C.M.L.R. at 420.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 304, [1966] C.M.L.R. at 421-22.
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Treaty provisions. 30 The agreement had the object of restricting
parallel imports and was not justifiable as being necessary to prevent confusion. This decision has given the Court vast discretion.
Rights are usually defined by the various ways in which they can
be exercised. The distinction between existence and exercise cannot be drawn by logical analysis. The Court, acting as a supreme
court, has been able to develop the law actively. The Court treats
the "justifiable" enforcement of rights as part of the right itself,
that is, the right's existence, and classifying enforcement of the
improper as its exerright for a purpose that the Court considers
31
cise, which is subject to the EEC Treaty.
E. Exhaustion of intellectual property rights when the product
has been sold by or with the consent of the holder
In Centrafarm BV v. Sterling Drug Inc.,32 the European Court
of Justice developed the concept of international exhaustion. In
words repeated in many judgments to follow, the Court said that
Article 30 is a "fundamental principle" of Community law.33 Article 36 derogates from the principle and, therefore, should be construed narrowly. 34 The Court developed the concept of the "specific subject matter" of an intellectual property right.
In relation to patents, the specific subject matter of the industrial property is the guarantee that the patentee, to reward the creative effort of the inventor, has the exclusive
right to use an invention with a view to manufacturing industrial products and putting them into circulation for the
first time, either directly or by the grant of licences to35third
parties, as well as the right to oppose infringements.

30. Id. at 344-46, [1966] C.M.L.R. at 475-77.
31. In 1966, after the refusal by the French to attend the Council of Ministers, the
legislative mechanism of the Common Market broke down. Little important legislation was adopted between 1966 and the adoption of the Single European Act in 1987.

Judges of the European Court of Justice admitted being highly activist during this
period.
32. Case 15/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1147, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 480.
33. id. at 1162, 18, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 503.
34. Id.

35. Id. at 1162, 19, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 503 (emphasis added).
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reward the inventor-and to the mechanism for doing that-the
exclusive right. The Court objected to the limitation in national
laws of the concept of exhaustion to sales within the country. The.
Court concluded that:
Whereas an obstacle to the free movement of goods of this
kind may be justified on (1) the ground of protection of industrial property where such protection is invoked against
a product coming from a Member State where it is not patentable and has been manufactured by third parties without
the consent of the patentee and (2) in cases where there
exist patents, the original proprietors of which are legally
and economically independent, a derogation from the principle of the free movement of goods is not, however, justified where the product has been put onto the market in a
legal manner, by the patentee himself or with his consent,
in the Member State from which it has been imported, in
particular in the case of a proprietor of parallel patents.3 6
The Court ruled that:.
The exercise, by a patentee, of the right which he enjoys
under the legislation of a Member State to prohibit the sale,
in that State, of a product protected by the patent which has
been marketed in another Member State by the patentee or
with his consent is incompatible with the rules of the EEC
Treaty concerning the free movement of goods within the
Common Market.37
This judgment considerably reduced the value of intellectual
property rights. Holders lost the ability to discriminate between
Member States. The policy of some Member States to keep down
the price of drugs at the expense of the pharmaceutical companies
was extended to those Member States that were more concerned
with encouraging innovation.

36. Id. at 1162-63, 111, [19741 2 C.M.L.R. at 503-04 (emphasis and numbering
added).
37. Id. at 1168, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 507.
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1. The Court retracts somewhat
The importance of consent by the holder of the intellectual
property rights was reiterated in Keurkoop BV v. Nancy Kean Gifts
BV. 38 In this case, the holder was allowed to exercise its right to
restrain imports when the holder had not consented to the sale in
another Member State where it had no intellectual property right.
The Court stated that, in the present state of Community law,
before intellectual property rights are harmonized, it is for national
law to define the scope of intellectual property rights. 39 The Court
openly distinguished between the legitimate and improper exercise
of national intellectual property rights and laid the ground for the
exercise of its discretion in later cases on grounds more clearly
based on policy. 4°
After considering the possibilities of applying Article 85 to any
agreement there might be, the Court ruled that the holder may prevent importation of infringing products from another Member State:
[P]rovided that the products in question have not been put
into circulation in the other Member State by, or with the
consent of, the proprietor of a right or a person legally or
economically dependent on him, that as between the natural
or legal persons in question there is no kind of agreement
or concerted practice in restraint of competition and finally
that the respective rights of the proprietors of the right to
the design in the various Member States were created independently of one another. 4'
Without the independent origin of the products, the agreement
would likely be contrary to Article 85.
2. Incentives and rewards for innovation
In two recent cases, the Court was concerned whether the enforcement of national law was justified, as required by Article 36,
by the provision of incentives to or rewards for desirable activity.

38.
39.
40.
41.

Case 144/81, [1982] E.C.R. 2853, [1983] 2 C.M.L.R. 47.
Id. at 2871, 18, [1983] 2 C.M.L.R. at 82.
Id. at 2873, 1 24, [1983] 2 C.M.L.R. at 83.
Id. at 2874, 1 29, [1983] 2 C.M.L.R. at 84.
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The Court also had to ensure that there was no discrimination
against goods imported from another Member State.
In Thetford Corp. v. Fiamma SpA, 42 the Court recognized that
the U.K. rule (now repealed) permitting a patent to be obtained if
the idea was not published in a patent specification anywhere in the
last fifty years was adopted in order
to foster creative activity on the part of inventors in the
interest of industry. To that end, the "fifty year rule" aimed
to make it possible to give a reward, in the form of the
grant of a patent, even in cases in which an "old" invention
was "rediscovered." In such cases the United Kingdom
legislation was designed to prevent the existence of a former patent specification which had never been utilized or
published from constituting a ground for revoking a patent
which had been validly issued.
Consequently, a rule such as the "fifty year rule" cannot be
regarded as constituting a restriction on trade between
Member States. 3
In Warner Bros. v. Christiansen,44 the Court refused to follow
the traditional case law analysis of Advocate-General Mancini. It
focused more on rewards to the holder and on the custom of the
industry. 45 The Court reiterated its statement from Keurkoop46 that
given the present state of Community law, it is for national law to
define the scope of intellectual property rights. Moreover, the
Court considered that the Danish law, under which the letting out
for hire of the videocassette of a film that had been bought in London was a separate infringing act, was justifiable on grounds of
industrial and commercial property within the meaning of Article
36 in view of the importance of the rental market and of the need

42. Case' 35/87, [1988] E.C.R. 3585, [1988] 3 C.M.L.R. 549.
43. Id. at 3607, " 19-20, [1988] 3 C.M.L.R. at 561-62.
44. Case 158/86, [1988] E.C.R. 2605, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 684.
45. Id. at 2628-29, 1 10-15, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 697-99.
46. Keurkoop BV v. Nancy Kean Gifts BV, [1982] E.C.R. 2853, [1983] 2
C.M.L.R. 47.
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for the film producer to earn a fair reward. 47

I. THE COMMISSION'S COMPETm VE CONCERNS ABOUT TECHNOLOGY LICENSES

A. Limited exclusive licenses foreclose and divide the Common
Market
Certainly, from 1972 until after the adoption of the Patent Regulation,48 the Commission considered that a territorially limited
license should be treated as a license for the whole Common Market, subject to bans on manufacture and sale in other Member
States. For example, once the goods have been sold in France by
the holder or with his consent, the holder cannot use his German
patent to prevent the import of the goods into Germany because of
the principle of free movement. The Court's case law does not go
so far as to say that the French licensee cannot be restrained from
manufacture in Germany, but the Commission has adopted this
view.49
In Davidson Rubber,50 Davidson had developed, and was exploiting in America, an invention for making plastic arm rests for
cars and the machinery needed to produce them. In 1957, shortly
before the Common Market was established, it granted parallel limited and exclusive licenses to three firms for different territories in
the EEC. The Commission stated that each exclusive license had
the object and effect of restricting competition within the Common
Market, and might affect trade between Member States, because it
restrained Davidson from granting another license for another
Member State.5 ' Such a licensee might then have exported to other
Member States.
This is a per se rule, subject only to a de minimis limitation
when the parties have only a small share of the market at the time
47. Warner Bros., [1988] E.C.R. at 2629, 1 14-16.
48. Patent Regulation, supra note 18.
49. CoMMissioN FIFTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1 81 (1985).
50. Re Agreements of Davidson Rubber Co., J.O. L 143/31 (1972), [1972] 11
C.M.L.R. D52.
51. Id. at 35,1 8, [1972] 11 C.M.L.R. at D59-60, 1 39.
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the Commission investigates. Since it may be risky to persuade a
vehicle manufacturer to adopt a particular kind of arm rest and then
set up a production line, the licensee most needs the protection of
exclusivity when the invention proves successful. To induce investment despite the risk of commercial failure, the licensee must
be able to expect to earn high profits if the venture is successful.
In 1957, when the investment was made, there were no Davidson
arm rests in the Common Market. By 1972, when the decision was
adopted, Davidson's licensees supplied nearly forty percent of the
Common Market. The investment Was very successful. The Commission tends to see only the inventions that are successful and
may underestimate the risk of failure.
Nevertheless, the Commission did grant an exemption, once the
agreement was modified to permit each licensee to sell throughout
the Common Market.12 The Commission stated that without the
protection of an exclusive manufacturing territory, the Davidson
process would not have been available in Europe. This illustrates
that when applying Article 85(1) to an exclusive territory, the Commission does not take realistic possibilities into account. The Commission condemns restrictions on conduct, not only restrictions on
competition. The market must have become more competitive
when a new competitive pressure was added by the Davidson licensees.
In Nungesser,53 however, the Court held that an open exclusive
license for plant breeders' rights for an important new variety does
not infringe Article 85(1), although export bans on parallel importers and other licensees give absolute territorial protection and
"manifestly" go too far to be exempted. The Court is very formal,
giving considerable protection to products for which freight is a
significant cost, but virtually none when it is not. The Commission
accepts in principle that the Court's judgment applies also to patents, but has never applied the precedent. The Commission always
states that the product is not new, even when better than competing

52. Id. at 36-37, (N 16-18, [1972] 11 C.M.L.R. at D62-63, 11 50-55.
53. L.C. Nungesser KG v. Commission, Case 258/78, [1982] E.C.R. 2015, [1983]
1 C.M.L.R. 278.
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products.54
The Commission's broad application of the prohibition of Article 85(1) to exclusive licenses is the main reason why business
people turn to the Know-how Regulation 5s for automatic exemption
without notification.
B. No challenge clausesforeclose when the patent is not valid
In Davidson,56 the Commission granted the exemption only
after the parties removed the restraint on the licensee challenging
the validity of the patent. In some of the countries that later joined
the Common Market, patents were not examined, even for novelty,
when the patent was granted, and the Commission considered that
the licensee had the greatest interest in and means of challenging
invalid patents. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether making no
challenge clauses invalid is the best way of dealing with the entry
barrier caused by dubiously valid patents. The decision must have
reduced the propensity of holders to grant licenses to those over
whom they have no control. Under the group exemption, however,
one may provide that the licensor shall have the right to terminate
the license in the event of challenge, so the licensee cannot have
his cake and eat it too.
C. Strong obligations to share improvements are unfair and
reduce the incentive to invest in improvements
"Fair competition" is mentioned in the preamble to the EEC
Treaty, and the Commission considers it unfair to require a licensee
to enable the holder to obtain intellectual property rights in improvements discovered by the licensee. 57 The Commission does,
however, accept reciprocal obligations to pass on improvements
with a right for the licensor to sub-license that are not exclusively
in his favor. Again we have clear rules, based on legal classifica-

54. E.g., Re Agreement between Jus-Rol and Rich Prods. Corp., O.J. L 69/21 (1988),
[1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 527.
55. Know-how Regulation, supra note 18.
56. O.J. L 143/31 (1972), [1972] 11 C.M.L.R. D52.
57. It seems misguided to try to provide control over particular clauses in a contract.
It is the balance of the contract as a whole that matters. Civil law lawyers are, however,
more category-oriented than common law lawyers.
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tions, rather than economic analysis as to whether the agreement
affects the sort of industry where the licensee is likely to learn by
doing, in which case the innovations are probably not discouraged
and their exploitation is increased, or would have to invest to provide innovations, which investment might be discouraged by the
need to share the improvements.
IV. THE GROUP EXEMPTION REGULATIONS FOR PATENT AND
KNOW-HOW LICENSES

Detailed analysis of the Patent Regulation and the Know-how
Regulation 58 is beyond the scope of this paper. Briefly, their structure is similar: Article 1 of each Regulation exempts an exclusive
territory, plus associated limited export bans on licensor and licensees, but not on purchasers from the licensor or licensees.5 9 Little
protection can be conferred on each licensee against others within
the Common Market. Market integration is thought by many to be
served by these limitations, but they may encourage licensors to
grant larger territories than they would if more protection were
possible. Article 2 provides a non-exhaustive list of provisions that
rarely restrict competition contrary to Article 85(1), but are exempted just in case.60 Article 3 provides the black list of conditions and
provisions that prevent the application of the Regulations. 6' Sometimes these circumscribe the lists in Articles 1 and 2; sometimes
there is intermediate ground.
Usually one can achieve more of what a client wants by use of
the Know-how Regulation, provided that secret, substantial, and recorded information 62 is included. Note the words at the beginning

58. Patent Regulation, supra note 18; Know-how Regulation, supra note 18.
59. Patent Regulation, supra note 18, art. 1, recitals 9, 12; Know-how Regulation,
supra note 18, art. 1.

60. Patent Regulation, supra note 18, art. 2, recital 18; Know-how Regulation,
supra note 18, art. 2.

61. Patent Regulation, supra note 18, art. 3, recitals 19-24; Know-how Regulation, supra note 18, art. 3.
62. Note the definitions in Article 1(7). Where a licensee is prepared to pay for a
license, these requirements will almost always be fulfilled. They were inserted to
satisfy the Economic and Social Committee and European Parliament but drafted to
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of Article 1-it is only agreements that are exempted by the Patent
Regulation that are excluded. If they are exempted by that Regulation, I do not mind that they are not exempted by this. A license
of mixed patents and know-how may, however, benefit from the
more qualified black list of the Know-how Regulation, whether or
not the patent is ancillary to the know-how, which avoids some
impossible decisions as to which of two complementary things is
ancillary to the other.63
A. Two clauses taken through the group exemption for knowhow licensing as an example of how it operates

The way to apply the Regulation is to go through both the
white and black lists, Articles 1 or 2 and 3, in relation to each
clause. I have analyzed them at some length in my book on the
Regulation.'
1. Extent of territorial protection of the licensor
If one has technology, partly protected by patents and partly
consisting of secret know-how, and wants to exploit it oneself in
parts of the Common Market, can the technology be licensed to another for particular territories without exposing the areas where the
licensor wants to exploit the technology to competition?
This a major problem. Under Article 1, a licensor can restrain
a licensee from exploiting in the licensor's territory, as long as the
licensor holds a patent there65 or for ten years from the first license
for "the same technology" in the licensee's territory.' Unfortunately, "the same technology" includes the original version, even
if it has later been improved. 67 Sometimes, it is hard to tell what
is improved technology and what is a new license-the difference
may consist largely of careful drafting.

have little content.
63. See Boussois/lnterpane, O.J. L 50/30 (1987), [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 124.
Patent Regulation does not apply when the know-how is crucial.
64. VALENTINE KORAH, KNOW-HOW LICENSING AGREEMENTS

COMPETITION RULES: REGULATION 556/89 (1989).
65. Know-how Regulation, supra note 18, art. 1.1.3, 1.4.

66. Id. art. 1.2.
67. Id. art. 1.7.8.
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If the licensee sells the goods to dealers in his territory, the
licensee can use another group exemption68 to restrain the dealers
from actively selling outside the licensee's territory. The licensee
can restrain dealers from accepting unsolicited orders, but why
should he? If the licensor requires the licensee to do so, their license agreement will be outside' the Know-how Regulation. 69 The
licensee has no independent interest in protecting the licensor's
territory. Sometimes the licensee is dependent on the licensor or
values the relationship and might impose such a restriction on dealers, but the Commission easily detects a concerted practice between
parties to an agreement, so even that might be dangerous.
A patent holder can exercise his patent to prevent parallel imports from outside the Common Market, 70 but not to prevent goods
from coming from another Member State, once the goods have
been sold there with the holder's consent. The extent of the exclusivity exempted by Article 1(1) is narrow, especially when freight
is not a significant cost.
2. Agreement to pay monies in advance
Recitals are very important in EEC law and may govern the
operative part of the Regulation. Recital 15 states that the parties
are free to negotiate royalties as they want. Article 2(9) white lists
an obligation to pay minimum royalties, or a requirement to produce a minimum amount. Recital 10 states that the obligations
listed in Article 2 rarely restrict competition, but are exempted just
in case they may do so in a particular case. It adds that the list is
not exhaustive.
A payment up front has much the same effect as a minimum
royalty in that once the obligation is accepted, there is a smaller
payment for increasing production. Payments up front were cleared
68. Commission Regulation No. 1983/83, O.J. L 173/1 (1983), corrected by O.J.
C 101/2 (1984), which exempts some exclusive distribution agreements-agreements
to supply only a specified person with goods for resale in a specified territory.
69. Know-how Regulation, supra note 18, art. 3.12(b) blacklists a requirement to
make it difficult for users or resellers to obtain the contract goods within the Common
Market.
70. E.M.I. Records Ltd. v. CBS United Kingdom Ltd., Case 51/75, [1976] E.C.R.
811, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 235.
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as outside the prohibition of Article 85(1) in Boussois/interpane,71
before the Regulation was adopted.
Article 3(9) is not a great danger-the Regulation does not apply where one party is restricted from competing, e.g., by using
rival technology. A licensee who made a payment up front is
probably paying lower royalties than he would otherwise have
done, so is less tempted to resort to rival technology. Nevertheless,
a payment up front is less foreclosing than a requirement to use the
technology for a minimum number of operations-a white listed
clause-so I am pretty sure in the light of recital 10 that such a
clause rarely infringes the prohibition of Article 85(1) and may be
exempted by Article 2(1)(9) and 2(2) or (3) if it does.
B. The Commission's plans for when the Patent Regulation
expires next year
The Patent Regulation expires at the end of 1994. Mr. Guttuso,
drafter of the Know-how Regulation, is considering amendment of
the latter to cover pure patent licenses, which are not now within
its scope. If the Commission adopts this view, there will be no
need to renew the Patent Regulation, although some transitional
provisions will be needed to cover patent licenses that are currently
outside the Know-how Regulation and are adapted to come within
it.
V.

CONCLUSION

EEC law is formalistic, and based on pigeon holes. The Commission hopes that this gives rise to greater certainty. Lawyers are
able to read a license and decide whether it is valid, without having
to take market considerations into account under Article 85(1).
The Commission will be able to make a more realistic appraisal
under Article 85(3), but the Commission lacks the resources to
grant many formal exemptions and comfort letters stating that the
agreement merits exemption may be unhelpful when one tries to
enforce the ancillary provisions. The Know-how Regulation is
probably the most useful of the group exemptions, but expressly
71. O.J. L 50/30 (1987), [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 124.
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excludes copyright and software licenses,72 not because the Commission is hostile towards them, but because it has not had sufficient experience to grant a block exemption-to make them legal
per se. Signor Guttuso, who is responsible in the coordination of
Directorate A of the Commission's competition directorate, is very
liberal.
I would prefer the use of a rule of reason under Article 85(1),
modelled along the lines of Abbott B. Lipsky's speech on "the nine
no-noes," 73 but that is not the European way.

72. Know-how Regulation, supra note 18, art. 5(l)(4). The Regulation is also applicable to trademark licenses, unless the mark is ancillary to the technology.
73. Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr., Current Antitrust Division Views on Patent Licensing
Practices, in 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 515 (1981).

